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Union representation, collective voice and job quality: an analysis of a survey of union 
members in the UK finance sector 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to identify whether employee perceptions of job quality are better in 
instances where an onsite union representative is present. It also seeks to identify whether the 
relationship between onsite representatives and job quality is explained by employee 
perceptions of union collective voice. The analysis, based on a survey of union members in 
the UK finance sector, demonstrates that employee perceptions of several dimensions of job 
quality are better where an onsite representative is present, and that this can be explained by 
the higher perceptions of union collective voice that onsite representatives engender.  
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Introduction 
Research on the activities of shop stewards and onsite union representatives has been central 
to the study of workplace union organisation for many years (Charlwood and Terry, 2007). 
Past studies have focused on the benefits that such representatives generate for employees in 
terms of improvements to terms and conditions of employment, equality of outcomes and 
disciplinary procedures (Waddington, 2013). There has, however, been a widely recognised  
decline in recent times in the presence of onsite union representatives in British workplaces 
(Kersley et al., 2006: 124; Terry, 2003: 259), and this has been accompanied by concerns as 
to whether unions still have sufficient power to influence employer decision-making 
(Charlwood and Forth, 2009). Given these concerns, there has been a resurgence of debate 
among policy-makers, employers’ organisations and trade unions over the contribution onsite 
representatives make to building effective relationships at work, with codes of practice for 
statutory time-off for trade union duties and activities having been revised and subjected to 
ongoing review (ACAS, 2008; BERR, 2007, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2012; TUC, 2012).  
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The aim of this paper is to contribute towards this debate by exploring the impact of 
onsite union representatives on an outcome that has for many years been accorded significant 
importance within the employment relations literature – job quality. This is defined in the 
literature as incorporating both intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes such as high pay, job 
security, participation in decision-making, task discretion, skill, autonomy, work-life balance, 
and job stress (Clark, 2005; Doellgast et al., 2009: 490; Green, 2009: 9). Although unions 
have arguably focused traditionally on the economic aspects of the employment relationship, 
prioritising bargaining over terms and conditions, the goal of improving job quality has also 
been a matter of longstanding union concern (Bryson et al., 2004: 441; Doellgast et al., 2009: 
506; Holman, 2103a: 476), and onsite union representatives may have an important role to 
play in achieving this goal. The achievement of better job quality has also been accorded 
significant political importance. The European Union’s employment strategy has focused on 
the promotion of job quality (as well as job quantity) since its inception in the late 1990s 
(Green et al., 2013: 753; Holman, 2013a: 476; Smith et al., 2008: 586). The goal of job 
quality also underpinned the former British Labour Government’s education and training 
policies and its support for the employer-union ‘partnership’ agenda (Brown et al., 2007: 
943), and it has featured in discussions on happiness and subjective well-being as an area of 
public policy and government action (Reeves, 2009), having become central to attempts to 
measure such outcomes (Green et al., 2013:753). 
 Mirroring the importance accorded to job quality in both political and union circles is 
extensive evidence pointing to its positive impact on a range of both individual and 
organisational outcomes. In particular, it has been found to be associated with overall 
individual well-being (Green, 2008; 2009: 8, 18), and has been closely linked to job 
satisfaction (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990: 262-3), which in turn has been identified as an 
important antecedent of higher productivity, increased discretionary effort, fewer quits and 
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lower absenteeism (Clark, 2005: 380; Coats and Lekhi, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012; 
Gazioglu and Tansel, 2006: 1163). It has also been associated with smoother labour market 
transitions and higher labour market participation rates (Smith et al., 2008: 588), and is 
viewed as an important antecedent of lower levels of workplace conflict (Green, 2009: 9), 
better mental health and reduced stress (Wood, 2008). The achievement of higher job quality 
would thus appear to have the potential to enhance a range of important socio-economic 
outcomes. 
There is, however, growing concern that several dimensions of job quality have 
deteriorated since the early 1990s (Kalleberg, 2003; Smith et al., 2008: 588), with work 
intensity having increased (Brown et al., 2007: 942; Clark, 2005: 393; Handel, 2005: 84; 
Green et al., 2013: 766) and employee discretion and task autonomy having declined (Brown 
et al., 2007: 942; Clark, 2005: 383; Green, 2009: 18; Olsen et al., 2010: 222). Such changes 
appear particularly pronounced in the UK (Clark, 2005: 394) having been driven in part by 
the recent government policy emphasis on labour market flexibility (Brown et al., 2007). 
Beyond this, higher unemployment and weaker labour markets in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis have increased the pressure on governments to prioritise job creation over job 
quality, while pressure on employers to focus on job quality as a retention strategy has 
weakened. As Kalleberg (2012: 431) argues, during periods of high unemployment, concerns 
over job quality tend to diminish given that ‘having any job is generally regarded as better 
than having no job at all’.   
Hence, identifying ways in which job quality can be influenced positively might be 
deemed particularly important in the current climate. This paper seeks to contribute towards 
this issue by drawing on a survey of union members in the UK finance sector within the 
Unite trade union (Britain’s largest trade union with 1.4 million members and over 140,000 
members in the finance sector) in order to address whether, and in what ways, onsite union 
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representatives are able to influence job quality positively in the workplaces within which 
they are located. 
 
Theorising the association between onsite union representatives and job quality 
From the extant literature, it is possible to discern a number of ways in which onsite union 
representatives might influence levels of job quality. In exploring this issue from a theoretical 
perspective, a useful starting point is Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) collective voice/ 
institutional response model. This model suggests a ‘positive voice effects’ hypothesis, 
whereby if unions voice their members’ job quality concerns via either informal 
communication channels or collective bargaining processes, this will bring job quality 
problems to the attention of management, who will then subsequently respond by making 
changes within the workplace to seek to address these problems (Wood, 2008: 154). Such 
collective voice effects may well be amplified where onsite representatives are present, given 
the role they play in seeking out the views of members, listening to their concerns and 
bringing these concerns to managers’ attention (Bryson and Forth, 2010). 
One must keep in mind, however, that positive voice effects of this nature will only 
emerge where the expression of collective voice is heard by managers (Guest and Conway, 
2004) and if managers are willing (or compelled) to respond constructively. This in turn is 
likely to depend on the union’s scope for involvement in decision-making and on its 
bargaining strength. Where there is an absence of institutional support (as provided by 
Germany’s codetermination laws, for example) aimed at enhancing the ability of workers’ 
representatives to exercise voice in company decisions (Kalleberg, 2012: 436), or where 
union bargaining power is weak, the union’s ability to pressure employers to improve job 
quality is likely to be restricted (Brown et al., 2007: 949). Hence, even if onsite union 
representatives listen to their members’ job quality concerns and convey those concerns to 
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management through collective voice mechanisms, there is no guarantee that this will result 
in job quality improvements.  
 There is considerable empirical evidence in support of this argument. For example, 
Holman (2013a,b) finds in studies exploring data from call centres and from the European 
Working Conditions Survey that while unions do have the potential to influence job quality 
positively, this is more likely to happen in countries where they have sufficient power to 
influence employer decision-making (in Denmark and Sweden, for example). Similarly, 
Green et al. (2013) attribute higher levels of job quality in co-ordinated market economies in 
part to union strength. Doellgast et al.’s (2009) research on front-line service employees 
across different countries also finds the ability of unions to influence job quality to be 
dependent on their strength, while Esser and Olsen (2012), using data from the European 
Social Survey, find aspects of job quality (in particular job autonomy and job security) to be 
higher in countries where unions have sufficient power to constrain the actions of employers.  
 By contrast, in countries where union strength is low and institutional support for 
union voice is lacking, the extant research suggests that unions have had significantly less 
success in influencing job quality positively. Indeed, Green et al. (2013: 757-758) argue that 
poorer job quality in the US and the UK should not come as a surprise given the weakness of 
unions within these countries, while Holman (2013b: 26) suggests that poorer levels of job 
quality in market regimes such as the UK can be explained by the absence of institutions such 
as works councils that facilitate the ability of unions to express collective voice. Further to 
this, Willman et al. (2007) argue that union voice effects may have become muted in the UK 
in recent years given that declining union density means that union representatives are less 
able to claim to speak for the majority (or even a sizeable proportion) of the workforce, thus 
the impact and credibility of union voice has diminished. It is far from certain, therefore, 
whether one would expect onsite union representatives in the UK to be able to raise levels of 
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collective voice and to translate this successfully into positive outcomes with regard to job 
quality. It is quite possible that even if union representatives listen to their members’ views 
and attempt to voice these views to management, they may lack the leverage and credibility 
to elicit a positive employer response. As such, it is unclear how far one would expect a 
‘positive voice effects’ hypothesis to be supported. 
Beyond this, however, even if positive voice effects do emerge, there are reasons to 
doubt that they will hold across all facets of job quality. This is because local level managers 
may have insufficient discretion to be able to amend employer policy or implement informal 
rules in response to pressure from onsite representatives. As such, while some intrinsic job 
characteristics (such as whether the job is interesting/enjoyable, makes good use of 
individuals’ skills, minimises job stress, and is adjusted to help work-life balance) may be 
subject to local-level discretion, issues such as pay and job security are likely to be subject to 
centralised decisions that lie beyond the scope of local level managers. Hence, while union 
full-time officers and seconded representatives
1
 may, via negotiations with senior managers, 
have the ability to influence these latter elements of job quality at institutional or national 
level, onsite representatives are likely to be less able to influence them in their dealings with 
local-level managers. Further to this, onsite representatives’ attempts to address job quality at 
local level may be restrained by their own union if, for example, union full-time officers are 
pursuing a focus on pay and employment rather than intrinsic elements of job quality, or if 
challenges to managerial prerogatives over the organisation and pace of work are viewed has 
having the potential to threaten the future recognition of the union (Carter et al., 2012). 
There is, however a further reason, specific to the finance sector (on which the 
research presented in this paper is based), why support for a positive voice effects hypothesis 
might be muted. Onsite representation and activity in the sector was, in the 1990s, viewed as 
‘rudimentary’ (Waddington, 2013: 349), and as a result, finance sector unions subsequently 
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developed a general policy of increasing onsite representation and reducing reliance on the 
activities of seconded representatives and full-time officers to address shortfalls in onsite 
representation. However, assessment of the impact of this policy in four clearing banks 
between 1999 and 2008 suggested that this policy had failed, with the coverage of onsite reps 
having reduced, the proportion of union members prepared to seek their advice not having 
increased, and member satisfaction with the quality of onsite representation having declined 
(Waddington, 2013). This in turn leads to doubt over whether, in the case of the finance 
sector, onsite union representatives will have been successful in enhancing members’ 
perceptions of union voice, or if they have been successful in doing so, subsequently using 
this enhanced voice to improve levels of job quality.  
There are, therefore, a number of reasons why the ‘positive voice effects’ hypothesis 
might not be supported. Beyond this, however, one might argue that the collective voice 
effects that union representatives engender may impact on perceived levels of job quality in 
an opposite direction from that hypothesised above, hence it is possible to posit a ‘negative 
voice effects’ hypothesis. One element of this hypothesis, as argued by Hammer and Avgar 
(2005) and Meng (1990: 1635), is that collective voice channels may be seen as providing a 
mechanism by which workers who are dissatisfied with their jobs can express their 
discontent. Given this, dissatisfied unionised workers will have a lower propensity to quit the 
organisation than will non-union workers who have less scope to express their grievances. If 
onsite union representatives strengthen the collective voice effects that encourage workers 
who are dissatisfied with their job quality to remain with the organisation, this might result in 
lower aggregate reported perceptions of job quality than in workplaces where onsite 
representatives are not present. A further element of the ‘negative voice effects’ hypothesis is 
that unions may seek to utilise collective voice channels to increase workforce politicisation. 
One aspect of this might involve raising workers’ consciousness of the negative aspects of 
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their jobs (by highlighting the lack of participation in decision-making, limited training and 
skill development, low job security, job stress or a poor work-life balance, for example) in 
order to generate a sense of grievance and thereby strengthen the basis for collective action 
(Bryson and Freeman, 2103: 4). 
Such activity on the part of the union might be expected to have a number of effects. 
First, it may socialise union members to expect higher standards with regard to job quality 
(Guest and Conway, 2004), and given this they may adopt stricter criteria when making 
subjective judgements about their jobs than might non-unionised workers (Bryson and 
McKay, 1997; Hammer and Avgar, 2005: 244; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990: 281). Onsite 
representatives may play an important role in this socialisation process, hence members’ 
‘internal standards’ (Hammer and Avgar, 2005: 258) might be particularly high in 
workplaces where an onsite representative is present. Second, raising workers’ consciousness 
of the negative aspects of their jobs may result in greater workforce discontent and a more 
adversarial industrial relations climate. Should managers equate this with a reduction in 
employee discretionary effort and commitment (Gordon and Denisi, 1995: 223; Guest and 
Conway, 2004; Hammer and Avgar, 2005: 243; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990: 260), they 
may subsequently seek to exercise greater control over work processes via the introduction of 
more bureaucratised work systems. This in turn is likely to reduce the scope for employee 
autonomy and discretion (Hammer and Avgar, 2005: 241), thereby negatively influencing job 
quality. This might be particularly likely to happen in workplaces with an onsite union 
representative given that they may be a primary vehicle by which grievance identification and 
workforce politicisation occurs. 
This politicisation argument has been criticised, however, given that over time 
workers may come to blame unions as much as managers for unresolved job quality 
problems. Hence there are limits to which union representatives will wish to politicise 
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workers by generating a sense of grievance over the negative aspects of their jobs (Gordon 
and Denisi, 1995: 225; Hammer and Avgar, 2005: 243; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990: 261). 
It nevertheless remains a theoretical possibility that the voice effects potentially engendered 
by onsite union representation could influence job quality negatively. This paper will seek to 
identify whether there is empirical support for this ‘negative voice effects’ hypothesis. 
 A further reason, however, for questioning whether a positive relationship will exist 
between onsite union representation and job quality is that it is unlikely that onsite 
representatives will be randomly distributed among the population of unionised workplaces. 
It is widely argued that unions are more likely to organise workplaces that have job quality 
problems (Bryson et al., 2004: 441; Farber and Saks, 1980; Gordon and Denisi, 1995; 
Hammer and Avgar, 2005: 243; Miller, 1990; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990; Renaud, 2002). 
Indeed, a central notion of Kelly’s (2005) mobilisation theory is that where a collective sense 
of injustice develops (in relation to issues such as poor job quality), workers will seek union 
representation in order to pursue a remedy. In line with this, Bryson and Freeman (2013: 21) 
find in their analysis of large-scale datasets in both the UK and the US that poor working 
conditions are strongly correlated with the desire for union representation. Similarly, it is 
plausible that onsite representatives are more likely to be found in workplaces within which 
working conditions are poor, given that unions might perceive a particular need for onsite 
representation within such workplaces, and individuals with a greater propensity to engage in 
union activism may be particularly willing to take on a representative role. Hence, if there is a 
negative association between onsite representative presence and employee perceptions of job 
quality, this could be explained by the possibility that onsite representatives are located in 
workplaces that had poor job quality in the first instance. 
As the above discussion demonstrates, on the basis of the extant theory and evidence 
it remains open to question whether one would expect the presence of onsite union 
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representatives (and the collective voice effects they potentially engender) to be associated 
with more favourable employee perceptions of job quality in the UK context (and in the 
finance sector in particular). This paper seeks to shed light on this issue by addressing the 
following research aims. The first is to evaluate whether union members’ perceptions of the 
extent to which the local union provides effective collective voice are more favourable where 
an onsite representative is present (if not, there will be no grounds to argue for either the 
positive or negative voice effects hypotheses outlined above). The second is to evaluate 
whether union members’ reports of job quality are more or less favourable where an onsite 
representative is present than elsewhere. The third is to consider whether perceptions of the 
extent to which the local union provides effective collective voice mediates this relationship. 
If such support is found, this will suggest support for the ‘positive voice effects’ hypothesis 
(if the relationship between workplace representatives and job quality is positive) or the 
‘negative effects’ hypothesis (if the relationship between workplace representatives and job 
quality is negative). Should the results suggest a negative association between onsite union 
representatives and job quality, and should this remain once respondents’ perceptions of 
collective voice have been controlled for, this could suggest that the relationship between 
representatives and job quality is endogenous, such that onsite union representatives are 
located in workplaces that had particularly low levels of job quality in the first instance. 
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Method 
Data and context 
As mentioned above, the data used in this paper are taken from the Unite trade union finance 
sector members’ survey conducted in spring 2008. Unite is the largest trade union in the 
sector and represents workers in all grades and occupations across a range of employers 
including the major English and Scottish banks, insurance companies, building societies, 
finance houses and business services companies. The survey involved distributing a 
questionnaire by post to a random sample of 35,600 working members from a population of 
142,400.  3,087 responses were received, constituting a response rate of 8.7 per cent. 
Although this is in line with previous research drawing on surveys of union members in the 
finance sector (see, for example: Waddington, 2013), it nevertheless means that the results 
should be treated with caution. That said, the dataset has certain advantages in exploring the 
issues of interest to this paper given that it provides insights in terms of perceptions of 
collective voice effects and workplace experiences that are not usually available in broader 
cross-sector studies. 
In terms of industry composition, the UK finance sector includes banks and building 
societies (accounting for more than half of the output), insurance and pension companies, and 
financial intermediation services. This is reflected in the profile of respondents to the Unite 
finance members’ survey, a large proportion of whom (41 per cent) are from the large banks, 
with the next largest (13 per cent) being from large insurance companies. As such, just over 
half of respondents come from 10 employers: Barclays (15 per cent of respondents); Royal 
Bank of Scotland (14 per cent); HSBC (14 per cent); NatWest (6 per cent); Lloyds TSB (4 
per cent); Bank of Scotland (3 per cent); Allianz Cornhill (3 per cent); Friends Provident (3 
per cent); Royal Sun Alliance (2 per cent); and Norwich Union (2 per cent). In total, 
responses were received from employees across 174 companies. Cross checking the sample 
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against the characteristics of the population suggests it is broadly representative by gender 
(58 per cent of the sample are female against 53 per cent of the population), but slightly 
skewed towards younger people (10 per cent in the sample are aged under 30 against 6 per 
cent of the population).  
The sector on which the analysis is based (finance) is arguably particularly 
appropriate in exploring the research questions outlined above, given the nature of union 
activity in the sector. The UK Labour Force Survey reports trade union density in ‘financial 
intermediation’ in the UK to be 20.5 per cent (Achur, 2010). Union presence (defined as the 
proportion of employees whose workplace has a union present) and collective agreement 
coverage (defined as the proportion of employees whose pay and conditions are agreed in 
negotiations between the employer and a trade union) are reported as 43.3 per cent and 28.4 
per cent respectively. By comparison, in the economy as a whole, 24 per cent of workplaces 
in 2004 and 21 per cent of workplaces in 2011 had a recognised trade union (14 per cent of 
private sector workplaces in 2004 and 11 per cent of private sector workplaces in 2011), 
having fallen from 64 per cent of workplaces in 1980. As such, the collective organisation of 
finance workers is deemed to be ‘moderate’ (Gall, 2008: xiii). Given this, one might argue 
that finance is an appropriate sector in which to seek to identify union effects, and it would 
not be unreasonable to expect the results to hold in other sectors with similarly moderate (or 
stronger) levels of unionisation. 
The sector is important in economic terms, having accounted for between 6 per cent 
and 10 per cent of UK GDP in the last decade. It accounted for 3.6 per cent of employment 
(1.1 million employees) in 2012 (a figure broadly similar to before the financial crisis in 
2008) located in approximately 34,000 workplaces (Bank of England, 2011; House of 
Commons Library, 2012). More than one-third of employees are in managerial occupations, 
with less than one-third in administrative or secretarial roles, and a quarter in associate 
14 
 
professional and technical roles. The average salary of £49,826 per year is heavily skewed by 
the London job market, with almost a quarter of all financial services employment located in 
London. 
 
Measures 
 
Onsite union representative. The presence of an onsite union representative is measured 
using a single item: “Is there an office representative at your place of work?” In total, 48 per 
cent of respondents are in workplaces in which an onsite union representative is present.  
 
Collective Voice. Seven items measured on a five-point scale assess the extent to which 
respondents believe their local union provides effective collective voice. These are how good 
the local union is at: keeping everyone up to date about proposed changes; providing 
everyone with a chance to comment on proposed changes; responding to suggestions from 
members; dealing with work problems members may have; consulting members on matters 
that affect them at work; listening to their views; and representing members on issues that 
matter to them. These issues are considered pertinent to assessing the effectiveness of onsite 
union representation and collective voice in the finance sector (Waddington, 2013: 347), 
given the role onsite representatives play in seeking out the views of members, listening to 
their concerns and bringing these concerns to managers’ attention (Bryson and Forth, 2010). 
A principle component factor analysis demonstrated that all of these items loaded onto a 
single factor that explained 72 per cent of the total variance in the items, hence they were 
combined into a single scale (Cronbach alpha reliability of 0.93). 
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Job quality. There are multiple dimensions to job quality comprising both extrinsic and 
intrinsic factors (Gallie, 2013: 454), and as Smith et al. (2008: 590) argue, it is a complex 
concept to measure. As demonstrated by Table 1, there are no agreed definitions for it within 
the literature, with a wide and varied range of dimensions having been used in previous 
studies. Indeed, Table 1 points to 22 different dimensions of job quality in the extant 
research. Some have been used frequently (pay, autonomy and job discretion, job security, 
for example), while others are specific to individual studies.  
 
TABLE 1 here 
 
Further to this, there is also a division within the extant research between studies that 
take a subjective approach to the measurement of job quality, focusing on employees’ 
perceptions of particular aspects of the quality of their job (Holman, 2013b: 23), and studies 
that take a more objective approach, focusing on assessments of the tangible and observable 
job characteristics and features (Green et al., 2013). As Bryson and Freeman (2013) suggest, 
it is arguably more important to assess job quality from the former perspective, as it is in 
instances where employees perceive their job quality to be poor that negative socio-economic 
outcomes (higher labour turnover, lower productivity, poorer mental health and higher stress, 
for example) are likely to emerge. 
In line with this view, the Unite survey included nine items that relate to employee 
perceptions of several of the dimensions of job quality commonly referred to in the literature. 
Each of these items was measured on a four point scale ranging from 4= ‘strongly agree’ to 
1= ‘strongly disagree’. Six of the items referred to intrinsic content of the job, and a principle 
components factor analysis demonstrated that the items loaded onto a single factor that 
explained 62 per cent of the total variance in the items (‘my job is interesting and enjoyable’; 
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‘my job makes me feel that I have accomplished something’; ‘I have a say in how the work 
that I am responsible for gets done’; ‘my job makes full use of my skills and talents’; ‘my job 
enables me to learn new skills and develop my abilities’; ‘my job offers opportunities for 
advancement at work’). The six items were combined into a single scale labelled ‘job 
content’ (Cronbach alpha reliability of 0.87). The remaining three items referred to distinct 
dimensions of job quality and were therefore used as single item measures: job security (‘My 
job is secure’); job stress (‘My job is stressful’) and work-life balance (‘My job enables me to 
work the hours that suit my personal requirements’). 
 
Control variables. A range of factors that might otherwise influence the relationship between 
union representation, collective voice and job quality are controlled for in the analysis. Both 
individual and establishment characteristics are controlled for, including gender, ethnicity, 
work status (i.e. whether part-time or full-time), respondent age, salary, the size of the 
establishment the respondent works in (i.e. number of employees) and the geographical 
region of the respondent’s workplace. The Appendix contains details of the control variables 
used. 
 
Analytic procedure 
The paper’s first aim is to identify whether respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which 
the local union provides effective collective voice are more favourable where an onsite 
representative is present than where an onsite representative is not present. This is tested in an 
ordinary least squares equation that treats the collective voice measure outlined above as the 
dependent variable and the onsite representative dichotomous variable as the independent 
variable. The equation controls for the individual and establishment characteristics outlined 
earlier. 
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The paper’s second aim (to ascertain whether reports of job quality are more 
favourable where an onsite representative is present) is assessed in four equations within 
which the dependent variables are the four measures for job quality outlined above, and the 
independent variable is the onsite union representative dichotomous variable
1
. These 
equations also include controls for individual and establishment characteristics. 
The paper’s third aim is to assess whether respondents’ perceptions of the extent to 
which their local union provides them with effective collective voice mediates the 
relationship between the presence of onsite union representatives and job quality. This is 
tested following the mediation procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). These 
procedures state that the independent variable must affect the mediator (as identified by the 
paper’s first aim) and also the dependent variable (as identified by the paper’s second aim). 
Mediation exists when the dependent variable is regressed simultaneously onto the mediator 
and the independent variable, and the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable is less when the mediator is present. Full mediation occurs if the independent 
variable has no significant effect when the mediator is present. The size of the indirect effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable via the mediator is assessed using a 
Sobel test (Sobel 1982)
2
. 
Regression models were checked for multicollinearity among the independent 
variables using Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) and were below 2.1 among the main study 
variables in Table 2 and therefore well below the standard cut-off of 10 (Levin et al., 2006: 
1167)
3
.   
 
Results 
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients and correlations among 
the main variables are presented in Table 2.  
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TABLE 2 here 
 
The first stage of the analysis is to assess whether respondents’ perceptions of the 
extent to which their local union provides effective collective voice are more favourable 
where onsite union representatives are present than where they are not present. As argued 
earlier, if no differences emerge there will be no grounds to argue for either the positive or 
negative voice effects hypotheses outlined above. However, the results, given in Table 3, 
provide strong evidence to suggest that respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which their 
local union provides effective voice are indeed more favourable where onsite representatives 
are present than where not present (beta = .432, p < .001; the change in R-square following 
the addition of the union representative variable to the model indicating that it explains 10 per 
cent of the variation in voice). The evidence would appear to demonstrate, therefore, that the 
presence of onsite representatives is strongly associated with workers’ perceptions of how far 
the local union provides effective collective voice. 
 
TABLE 3 here 
 
The second aim of the paper is to ascertain whether respondents’ reports of job quality 
(with regard to job content, job security, job stress and work-life balance) are more 
favourable where an onsite representative is present than where not present. The results, 
presented in Table 4, demonstrate that respondents in workplaces with an onsite 
representative report higher job quality than do those in workplaces without an onsite 
representative where two of the four measures are concerned: job content (beta = .071, p < 
.05) and work-life balance (beta = .123, p < .001). There is also weak evidence (at the 10 per 
19 
 
cent significance level) that they report lower levels of job stress (beta=.056, p < .1). There is, 
however, no evidence to suggest that respondents in workplaces with an onsite representative 
perceive job security to be greater than do those in workplaces without a representative.  
 
TABLE 4 here 
 
The third aim of the paper is to assess whether respondents’ perceptions of the extent 
to which their local union provides them with effective voice mediate the relationship 
between the presence of onsite union representatives and job quality. Mediation is tested in 
instances where the presence of an onsite representative is significantly positively related to 
job quality. 
The results reported in Table 4 suggest significant support for mediation. When the 
presence of an onsite representative and respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which their 
local union provides effective collective voice are entered into the equations simultaneously, 
collective voice is significantly related to job content (beta = .151, p < .001) and to work-life 
balance (beta = .142, p < .001), the previously significant relationship between onsite 
representatives and job content reduces to non-significance (beta falls from .071 to .005, p 
non-significant), and the previously significant relationship between onsite representatives 
and work-life balance reduces in statistical significance (beta falls from .123, p < .001 to 
.061, p < .05). A Sobel test indicates that the indirect effect of union representatives on job 
content and work-life balance are significant (respectively, Sobel = 5.64, p < .001, and 3.40, 
p < .001). In other words, respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which the local union 
provides effective collective voice fully mediates the relationship between onsite 
representatives and job content, and partially mediates the relationship between onsite 
representatives and work-life balance. Where job stress is concerned, the weakly positive 
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relationship between the presence of an onsite representative and job stress becomes non-
significant when respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which their local union provides 
effective collective voice is entered into the equation (beta falls from -.056, p < .1 to -.042, p 
non-significant). Hence, the results overall suggest that the positive relationship between 
onsite representatives and job quality is explained at least in part by the collective voice 
effects they engender. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper drew on a survey of union members within the Unite trade union in the UK 
finance sector in order to evaluate the relationship between the presence of onsite union 
representatives and employee perceptions of job quality, and to evaluate whether the 
existence of such a relationship can be explained by the collective voice effects onsite 
representatives engender.   
In the event, the analysis revealed several notable outcomes. First, a strong positive 
relationship emerged between the presence of an onsite representative and respondents’ 
perceptions of the extent to which their local union provides them with effective collective 
voice. Second, respondents’ perceptions of three of the four aspects of job quality under 
observation (job content, work-life balance and job stress, but not job security) were more 
favourable where an onsite representative was present (although the association was weak for 
job stress). Third, the association between onsite union representation and respondents’ 
perceptions of job content and work-life balance was mediated by their perceptions of the 
extent to which their local union provides effective collective voice, while the results for job 
stress, though non-significant, showed a similar pattern. 
On balance, therefore, the results appear to support the ‘positive voice effects’ 
hypothesis posited by Freeman and Medoff (1984) that perceptions of job quality will be 
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higher where an onsite representative is present, and that this is explained by the higher levels 
of collective voice that such representatives engender. As such, the results provide support 
for the conclusions reached within previous empirical analysis concerning the potential for 
unions to influence job quality favourably (Holman, 2013a, b; Green, 2013; Doellgast et al., 
2009; Esser and Olsen, 2012). They also support the conclusions in the extant literature 
concerning the need for effective institutional support to facilitate the participation of unions 
in decision-making if a relationship between unions and job quality is to emerge (Holman, 
2013b; Kalleberg, 2012), the results here suggesting that onsite union representation is one 
such form of institutional support. That said, one might argue that the analysis in this paper 
also suggests that the magnitude of the overall union effect on job quality in the UK context 
is likely to be limited, given the decline in recent times in the presence of onsite union 
representatives in UK workplaces noted earlier (Kersley et al., 2006: 124; Terry, 2003: 259).  
The findings have several implications for unions and public policy. Previous research 
on the UK’s four clearing banks suggested that attempts by finance sector unions to develop 
onsite representation and reduce reliance on the activities of seconded reps and full-time 
officers had failed (Waddington, 2013). One might argue on the basis of the results from the 
broader finance sector presented here, however, that this policy may have been more 
successful than previously claimed, with members in workplaces with an onsite 
representative reporting better job quality than those in workplaces without a representative. 
This suggests that the Unite trade union at least may well have improved onsite 
representation and support to its members in recent years. 
More generally, the findings might be deemed particularly timely given recent 
revisions to codes of practice relating to statutory time-off for trade union duties and 
activities, and recent concern over the costs associated with such time-off (Cabinet Office, 
2012). The results presented here suggest, however, that assessments of the costs associated 
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with union representative time-off need also to take into account its positive effects (Mitchell 
et al., 2012; TUC, 2012). In particular, one might argue that by boosting job quality via voice 
effects, onsite union representatives are contributing indirectly towards a range of socio-
economic outcomes that, as discussed earlier, have been shown to stem from higher job 
quality, including: higher overall individual well-being (Green, 2008; 2009); higher job 
satisfaction (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1990: 262-3); higher productivity; fewer quits; lower 
absenteeism (Gazioglu and Tansel, 2006: 1163; Clark, 2005: 380; Coats and Lekhi, 2008); 
smoother labour market transitions; and higher labour market participation rates (Smith et al., 
2008: 588). As such, any future moves to weaken rights to time-off (as has happened already 
in the British civil service, for example) that reduce the ability of onsite union representatives 
to boost job quality via the enhancement of collective voice could in turn reduce the indirect 
positive influence of onsite union representatives on the socio-economic outcomes outlined 
above.  
It must be kept in mind, however, that onsite union representation, on the basis of the 
results presented here, appears to be positively associated with some elements of job quality 
but not others. In particular, there is no evidence of an association between onsite 
representative presence and job security. This might be seen as unsurprising given that 
employer concessions to union demands for greater job security may lead to significant 
additional labour costs in the event of a downturn, hence employers may be particularly 
resistant to attempts to influence this. It might also be unsurprising given that, as argued 
earlier, job security policies and staffing reductions are unlikely to be subject to a significant 
degree of managerial discretion at local level. As such, decisions on these matters may well 
be beyond the sphere of onsite union representatives’ influence.  
The finding that onsite representatives appear unable to influence all the facets of job 
quality under observation here may, however, be seen as having implications for the 
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development of a coherent body of research on job quality. As discussed above, there is no 
consensus in terms of how job quality should be defined within the extant literature, even in 
terms of whether it should be measured using objective job characteristics or employees’ 
perceptions of their job quality (Green, 2013; Holman, 2013b: 23). If it is the case, therefore, 
that certain antecedents (in this case, onsite union representation) influence some elements of 
job quality but not others, this in turn suggests that different studies may achieve different 
results depending on the definition of job quality that is adopted. Given this, one might argue 
that a coherent body of studies on job quality is unlikely to emerge unless agreement can first 
be reached in the literature in terms of how job quality should be defined, and unless 
acknowledgement is made of the possibility that different elements of job quality might be 
influenced by different antecedents in different ways. 
In interpreting the findings presented here, a number of caveats need to be kept in 
mind. One caveat is that the analysis is based on subjective measures of employees’ 
perceptions of particular aspects of their job quality (Holman, 2013b: 23). Future studies may 
also usefully assess whether the findings hold in analyses based on more objective measures 
of tangible and observable job characteristics and features (Green et al., 2013). An additional 
caveat is that the analysis is based on a single (albeit the predominant) union in the UK 
finance sector, hence the extent to which the findings can be generalised more broadly 
remains to be seen. Future research might therefore assess the impact of other unions in the 
finance sector on job quality including those which organise in single banks (Affinity and 
Accord in Lloyds Banking Group, and Advance in Santander Group, for example, which 
together represented 90,000 employees in 2009).  A final caveat is that the survey on which 
the analysis in this paper is based was conducted in spring 2008 before the worst effects of 
the ‘credit crunch’ and subsequent crisis in the finance sector took hold leading to the British 
government taking stakes in some banks. It is open to question, therefore, whether union 
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representatives will have continued to be able to mobilise collective voice to improve job 
quality outcomes during this period. That said, it is possible that in the period following the 
credit crunch, onsite unions may have had an important role to play in preventing 
redundancies. As such, while the analysis presented here did not find (as discussed above) a 
relationship between onsite union representation and perceived job security in the period 
leading up to the credit crunch, it is quite possible that such a relationship will have emerged 
subsequent to this.  
The results presented here suggest a number of other avenues for future research 
further to those outlined above. In particular, a more nuanced analysis of the antecedents of 
onsite union representative influence on job quality is arguably needed that considers the 
activities representatives engage in, distinguishing, for example, between the impact of active 
and inactive representatives. Onsite representative activity levels are likely to reflect the 
provision of facility time and access to management, suggesting that the impact of these 
factors requires further exploration. More research is also needed on the mechanics of how 
onsite union representative voice effects emerge. For example, it could be that while unions 
voice members’ concerns to onsite managers, these managers may not have sufficient 
influence to change employment practice themselves to address these concerns. They may, 
however, in turn voice the union’s concerns to more senior managers in the organisation, who 
do have sufficient influence to make the requisite changes.  
Further research is needed, therefore, to help address the caveats outlined above and 
to explore the precise mechanisms by which a union representative effect emerges. Should 
this research reach similar conclusions to those reached here, this will reinforce the argument 
that onsite union representatives, as a result of the positive voice effects they engender, are 
capable of having a significant positive impact on job quality and, by extension, on a broad 
range of socio-economic outcomes. 
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Notes 
 
1. Seconded representatives are/were lay representatives given full-time release from 
their employer in order to enable them to adopt a national-level or institution-wide 
role. They are now referred to as ‘Senior Workplace Representatives’ by Unite. 
 
2. The reported equations use OLS. The results for the equations using single-item 
dependent variables do not change when using ordered logit. 
3. The Sobel test is a direct test of the statistical significance of an indirect effect and is 
calculated by dividing the indirect effect ab (where a is the path X→M and b is the 
path M→Y) by its standard error sab, which is assessed against a normal distribution 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004). 
4. VIFs measure the extent of multicollinearity among predictor variables in a regression 
model. An independent variable that has a VIF equal to 2 (for example) indicates that 
the squared multiple correlation (SMC) between it and all the remaining independent 
variables in the model is 0.50 (i.e., VIF = 1 / (1 – SMC)). 
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Table 1: Dimensions of job quality used in the extant literature 
 
Dimension of job quality Study 
Pay Brown et al. (2007); Clark (2005); Doellgast et 
al. (2009); Green (2009); Holman (2013a, b); 
Leschke and Watt (2008); Olsen et al. (2010); 
Tilly (1997)  
Autonomy and job discretion Brown et al. (2007); Clark (2005); Doellgast et 
al. (2009);  Esser and Olsen (2012); Gallie (2007, 
2013); Green (2009, 2013); Holman (2013a,b); 
Olsen et al. (2010); Smith et al. (2008); Tilly 
(1997)  
Job security Clark (2005); Doellgast et al. (2009); Esser and 
Olsen (2013); Gallie (2007); Green (2009); 
Holman (2013a,b); Leschke and Watt (2008); 
Tilly (1997) 
Promotion prospects/ career advancement Clark (2005); Leschke and Watt (2008); Olsen et 
al. (2010); Tilly (1997) 
How hard, stressful or dangerous the job is Brown et al. (2007); Clark (2005); Green (2013); 
Olsen et al. (2010); Smith et al. (2008) 
Skill Brown et al. (2007); Gallie (2007); Green (2009); 
Holman (2013a,b) 
Effort Brown et al. (2007); Green (2009); Olsen et al. 
(2010) 
Participation in decision-making Doellgast et al. (2009); Gallie (2007, 2013); 
Holman (2013b); Leschke and Watt (2008) 
How interesting the work is and the monotony/ 
complexity of tasks 
Brown et al. (2007); Olsen et al. (2010) Smith et 
al (2008) 
Relations with colleagues Brown et al. (2007); Clark (2005); Olsen et al. 
(2010) 
Creative content of work Brown et al. (2007); Smith et al. (2008) 
Flexible forms of work and work-life balance Brown et al. (2007); Holman (2013a,b); Leschke 
and Watt (2008) 
Hours of work Clark (2005); Green (2013); Tilly (1997)  
Representation Gallie (2007); Holman (2013a); Leschke and 
Watt (2008) 
Non-standard forms of employment Leschke and Watt (2008) 
Position within organisation and class hierarchy Brown et al. (2007) 
Work that helps others and is useful to society Olsen et al. (2010) 
Prestige Clark (2005) 
Absence of detailed monitoring and surveillance Doellgast et al. (2009) 
Fringe benefits Tilly (1997) 
Due process in discipline Tilly (1997) 
The intellectual/ emotional demands of the job Smith et al. (2008) 
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Table 2: Means, standard deviations, alpha reliability and zero-order correlations 
between main study variables 
 
 M SE  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Onsite representative .48 .50       
2 Voice 2.88 .97  .41
***
 (.87)    
3 Job content 2.69 .63  .08
***
 .16
***
 (.93)   
4 Job security 2.52 .80  -.04† .06** .39***   
5 Job stress 3.13 .78  -.14
***
 -.07
**
 -.07
***
 -.09
***
  
6 Work life balance 2.63 .88  .18
***
 .18
***
 .30
***
 .17
***
 -.28
***
 
 
Notes: N = 1926. † p < .10,  ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Intercorrelations involving control 
variables are omitted from table.
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Table 3. Regression model examining the relationship between union representative 
presence and perceptions of employee voice 
 
 Voice 
     B     SE     β  p 
 
Sex (female) 
Ethnicity 
Part-time 
Age (<30) 
Age (30-39) 
Age (40-49) 
Age (50-59) 
Workplace size (<9) 
Workplace size (10-24) 
Workplace size (25-49) 
Workplace size (50-99) 
Workplace size (100-199) 
Workplace size (200-499) 
Workplace size (500-999) 
Pay (£12-19.9K) 
Pay (£20-29.8K) 
Pay (£29.9-42K) 
Pay (£42K plus) 
Region (NE) 
Region (SW) 
Region (NW) 
Region (Wales) 
Region (N & R Ireland) 
Region (Midlands E) 
Region (SE) 
Region (Midlands W) 
Region (Scotland) 
Union rep 
 
 
.054 
.033 
-.042 
.077 
-.056 
-.065 
-.057 
.179 
-.046 
-.057 
-.337 
-.259 
-.210 
-.087 
.062 
.112 
.090 
-.064 
-.112 
-.037 
-.073 
-.025 
.100 
-.114 
-.109 
-.095 
-.044 
.843 
 
.049 
.088 
.069 
.125 
.100 
.094 
.094 
.079 
.075 
.084 
.103 
.099 
.076 
.075 
.080 
.087 
.094 
.107 
.070 
.080 
.068 
.125 
.139 
.116 
.076 
.087 
.083 
.055 
 
 
.028 
.009 
-.018 
.018 
-.022 
-.032 
-.028 
.067 
-.019 
-.018 
-.075 
-.059 
-.066 
-.028 
.029 
.049 
.039 
-.020 
-.036 
-.010 
-.024 
-.004 
.017 
-.021 
-.032 
-.024 
-.012 
.432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
F 
R-square 
16.125*** 
.192 
  
Note: * p <  .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Omitted reference categories: age (> 59); workplace size (>999); pay 
(<£12K); region (London). N = 1926. OLS analysis.
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Table 4. Regression models examining relationships between union representatives, 
employee voice and job quality 
 
Note: † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. N = 1926. OLS analysis. 
 Job content Job content Job security 
     B     SE     β  p     B     SE     β  p    B  SE     β p 
 
Sex (female) 
Ethnicity 
Part-time 
Age (<30) 
Age (30-39) 
Age (40-49) 
Age (50-59) 
Workplace size (<9) 
Workplace size (10-24) 
Workplace size (25-49) 
Workplace size (50-99) 
Workplace size (100-199) 
Workplace size (200-499) 
Workplace size (500-999) 
Pay (£12-19.9K) 
Pay (£20-29.8K) 
Pay (£29.9-42K) 
Pay (£42K plus) 
Region (NE) 
Region (SW) 
Region (NW) 
Region (Wales) 
Region (N & R Ireland) 
Region (Midlands E) 
Region (SE) 
Region (Midlands W) 
Region (Scotland) 
Union rep 
Voice 
 
 
.071 
-.080 
-.009 
-.044 
-.145 
-.168 
-.195 
.082 
.067 
.082 
-.012 
-.047 
-.015 
-.070 
.022 
.249 
.330 
.508 
-.023 
.011 
.039 
-.129 
.091 
.157 
.007 
.039 
-.047 
.088 
 
.034 
.061 
.047 
.086 
.069 
.064 
.065 
.054 
.052 
.057 
.071 
.068 
.052 
.052 
.055 
.060 
.065 
.073 
.048 
.055 
.047 
.086 
.096 
.080 
.052 
.060 
.057 
.038 
 
.057 
-.033 
-.006 
-.016 
-.090 
-.131 
-.146 
.048 
.042 
.040 
-.004 
-.017 
-.007 
-.035 
.016 
.170 
.220 
.244 
-.012 
.005 
.020 
-.034 
.024 
.045 
.003 
.015 
-.020 
.071 
 
* 
 
 
 
* 
** 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
* 
 
.066 
-.083 
-.005 
-.051 
-.140 
-.162 
-.190 
.064 
.071 
.088 
.020 
-.022 
.006 
-.062 
.016 
.238 
.321 
.514 
-.012 
.014 
.046 
-.126 
.081 
.168 
.018 
.048 
-.043 
.007 
.097 
 
.034 
.060 
.047 
.085 
.068 
.064 
.064 
.054 
.051 
.057 
.070 
.067 
.052 
.051 
.054 
.060 
.064 
.073 
.048 
.054 
.046 
.085 
.095 
.079 
.051 
.059 
.056 
.040 
.016 
 
.053 
-.035 
-.003 
-.018 
-.087 
-.126 
-.142 
.037 
.045 
.042 
.007 
-.008 
.003 
-.031 
.011 
.163 
.215 
.246 
-.006 
.006 
.024 
-.034 
.021 
.049 
.008 
.019 
-.018 
.005 
.151 
 
* 
 
 
 
* 
* 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
-.031 
.019 
.061 
.016 
-.111 
-.191 
-.176 
.161 
.212 
.278 
.009 
.166 
.028 
.044 
.006 
-.007 
.094 
.051 
-.102 
-.076 
-.019 
-.074 
.425 
.056 
-.079 
-.063 
-.018 
.010 
 
.044 
.079 
.062 
.113 
.090 
.084 
.085 
.071 
.068 
.075 
.092 
.089 
.068 
.068 
.072 
.079 
.085 
.096 
.063 
.072 
.061 
.113 
.125 
.105 
.068 
.078 
.074 
.049 
 
-.020 
.006 
.032 
.004 
-.054 
-.116 
-.103 
.073 
.105 
.105 
.003 
.046 
.011 
.017 
.003 
-.004 
.049 
.019 
-.040 
-.026 
-.008 
-.015 
.088 
.013 
-.028 
-.020 
-.006 
.006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
* 
* 
** 
*** 
 
† 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
F 
R-square 
Change F 
Change R-square 
5.362*** 
.073 
  6.397*** 
.092 
38.235*** 
.018 
  2.334*** 
.033 
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Table 4 (continued) Regression models examining relationships between union 
representatives, employee voice and job quality 
 
 Job stress Job stress Work-life balance Work-life balance 
    B  SE    β  p    B SE    β  p    B SE    β  p    B SE    β  p 
 
Sex (female) 
Ethnicity 
Part-time 
Age (<30) 
Age (30-39) 
Age (40-49) 
Age (50-59) 
Workplace size (<9) 
Workplace size (10-24) 
Workplace size (25-49) 
Workplace size (50-99) 
Workplace size (100-199) 
Workplace size (200-499) 
Workplace size (500-999) 
Pay (£12-19.9K) 
Pay (£20-29.8K) 
Pay (£29.9-42K) 
Pay (£42K plus) 
Region (NE) 
Region (SW) 
Region (NW) 
Region (Wales) 
Region (N & R Ireland) 
Region (Midlands E) 
Region (SE) 
Region (Midlands W) 
Region (Scotland) 
Union rep 
Voice 
 
 
.127 
.007 
-.120 
.160 
.007 
.114 
.092 
.204 
.229 
.159 
-.121 
-.046 
-.104 
-.089 
.167 
.178 
.257 
.286 
.083 
-.005 
.091 
.104 
-.188 
-.099 
.046 
.091 
-.062 
-.087 
 
.042 
.076 
.059 
.108 
.086 
.080 
.081 
.068 
.065 
.072 
.088 
.085 
.065 
.065 
.069 
.075 
.081 
.092 
.060 
.068 
.058 
.108 
.119 
.100 
.065 
.074 
.071 
.047 
 
.081 
.002 
-.064 
.046 
.003 
.072 
.055 
.096 
.116 
.062 
-.034 
-.013 
-.041 
-.036 
.098 
.098 
.138 
.110 
.034 
-.002 
.038 
.022 
-.040 
-.023 
.017 
.029 
-.021 
-.056 
 
** 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
** 
*** 
* 
 
 
 
 
* 
* 
** 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† 
 
.128 
.008 
-.121 
.162 
.005 
.113 
.091 
.209 
.227 
.157 
-.130 
-.053 
-.110 
-.092 
.169 
.181 
.260 
.285 
.080 
-.006 
.089 
.103 
-.186 
-.102 
.043 
.089 
-.063 
-.066 
-.026 
 
.042 
.076 
.059 
.108 
.086 
.080 
.081 
.068 
.065 
.072 
.089 
.085 
.065 
.065 
.069 
.075 
.081 
.092 
.060 
.068 
.059 
.108 
.119 
.100 
.065 
.074 
.071 
.050 
.020 
 
.082 
.003 
-.065 
.047 
.003 
.071 
.054 
.098 
.115 
.061 
-.036 
-.015 
-.043 
-.037 
.099 
.100 
.139 
.110 
.032 
-.002 
.037 
.022 
-.039 
-.024 
.016 
.028 
-.021 
-.042 
-.032 
 
** 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
** 
*** 
* 
 
 
† 
 
* 
* 
*** 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.117 
-.163 
.470 
-.090 
-.056 
-.100 
-.196 
-.162 
-.240 
-.110 
-.140 
-.224 
.033 
.098 
-.109 
-.117 
-.048 
-.056 
-.166 
-.046 
-.064 
-.316 
.193 
.091 
-.053 
-.035 
.033 
.217 
 
.047 
.084 
.065 
.119 
.095 
.089 
.090 
.075 
.072 
.080 
.098 
.094 
.072 
.072 
.076 
.083 
.090 
.102 
.067 
.076 
.065 
.120 
.132 
.111 
.072 
.083 
.079 
.052 
 
-.066 
-.048 
.221 
-.023 
-.025 
-.055 
-.104 
-.067 
-.107 
-.038 
-.034 
-.056 
.011 
.035 
-.056 
-.057 
-.023 
-.019 
-.059 
-.014 
-.024 
-.060 
.036 
.019 
-.017 
-.010 
.010 
.123 
 
* 
† 
*** 
 
 
 
* 
* 
*** 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
-.124 
-.167 
.476 
-.100 
-.049 
-.091 
-.189 
-.185 
-.234 
-.103 
-.096 
-.191 
.060 
.109 
-.117 
-.132 
-.059 
-.047 
-.152 
-.041 
-.055 
-.313 
.180 
.106 
-.039 
-.023 
.038 
.108 
.129 
 
.047 
.083 
.065 
.118 
.095 
.088 
.089 
.075 
.071 
.079 
.097 
.093 
.072 
.071 
.075 
.083 
.089 
.101 
.066 
.075 
.064 
.118 
.131 
.110 
.071 
.082 
.078 
.055 
.022 
 
-.070 
-.049 
.224 
-.025 
-.022 
-.050 
-.100 
-.076 
-.105 
-.035 
-.024 
-.048 
.021 
.039 
-.060 
-.064 
-.028 
-.016 
-.054 
-.013 
-.020 
-.059 
.034 
.022 
-.013 
-.006 
.011 
.061 
.142 
 
** 
* 
*** 
 
 
 
* 
* 
*** 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
*** 
F 
R-square 
Change F 
Change R-square 
4.644*** 
.064 
  4.544*** 
.065 
1.697 
.001 
  8.248*** 
.109 
  9.326*** 
.125 
35.323 
.016 
  
Note: † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. N = 1926. OLS analysis. 
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Appendix. Means for control variables 
 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
   
Sex (female) 0.55 0.50 
Ethnicity 0.07 0.26 
Part-time 0.22 0.42 
Age (<30) 0.05 0.23 
Age (30-39) 0.19 0.39 
Age (40-49) 0.39 0.49 
Age (50-59) 0.33 0.47 
Age (60+) 0.05 0.21 
Workplace size (<9) 0.17 0.37 
Workplace size (10-24) 0.20 0.40 
Workplace size (25-49) 0.11 0.31 
Workplace size (50-99) 0.05 0.22 
Workplace size (100-199) 0.06 0.23 
Workplace size (200-499) 0.11 0.31 
Workplace size (500-999) 0.12 0.32 
Workplace size (1000+) 0.19 0.39 
Pay (<£12K) 0.13 0.32 
Pay (£12-19.9K) 0.30 0.46 
Pay (£20-29.8K) 0.24 0.43 
Pay (£29.9-42K) 0.23 0.42 
Pay (£42K plus) 0.10 0.30 
Region (NE) 0.15 0.36 
Region (London) 0.13 0.34 
Region (SW) 0.11 0.32 
Region (NW) 0.16 0.37 
Region (Wales) 0.04 0.19 
Region (N & R Ireland) 0.04 0.19 
Region (Midlands E) 0.05 0.21 
Region (SE) 0.13 0.33 
Region (Midlands W) 0.09 0.29 
Region (Scotland) 0.10 0.30 
N = 1926 
   
 
 
 
 
